Abstract

This reply appeared in a symposium on "Consciousness and the Physical World" published in Philosophical Psychology in 1992.This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism) initially presented in "Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World" (1990) also in Philosophical Psychology. The symposium begins with Velmans' summary of the main arguments in that paper, followed by critiques from two psychologists--Robert Rentoul and Norman Wetherick. Velmans replies to the critiques and the entire treatment is further critiqued by the philosopher Grant Gillett, followed by Velmans' final reply. At the time of this upload (25 years later) many of the points in the original paper have become common currency, however some of the confusions about the implications of the reflexive model persist, so the discussion continues to have contemporary relevance.