Functional Interpretation of Logics for ‘Generally’

Logic Journal of the IGPL 12 (6):627-640 (2004)
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Abstract

Logics for ‘generally’ are intended to express some vague notions, such as ‘generally’, ‘several’, ‘many’, ‘most’, etc., by means of the new generalized quantifier ∇ and to reason about assertions with ‘generally’ . We introduce the idea of functional interpretation for ‘generally’ and show that representative functions enable elimination of ∇ and reduce consequence to classical theories. Thus, one can use proof procedures and theorem provers for classical first-order logic to reason about assertions involving ‘generally’

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