Intentional Action Without Knowledge

Synthese 197:1-13 (2020)

Abstract

In order to be doing something intentionally, must one know that one is doing it? Some philosophers have answered yes. Our aim is to test a version of this knowledge thesis, what we call the Knowledge/Awareness Thesis, or KAT. KAT states that an agent is doing something intentionally only if he knows that he is doing it or is aware that he is doing it. Here, using vignettes featuring skilled action and vignettes featuring habitual action, we provide evidence that, in various scenarios, a majority of non-specialists regard agents as intentionally doing things that the agents do not know they are doing and are not aware of doing. This puts pressure on proponents of KAT and leaves it to them to find a way these results can coexist with KAT.

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Author Profiles

Romy Vekony
Florida State University
David Rose
Stanford University
Alfred Mele
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Practical Knowledge First.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.

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