Why Not Persuade the Skeptic? A Critique of Unambitious Epistemology

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):314-338 (2019)
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Abstract

What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without giving skeptics any good reason to change their minds. This is what I call unambitious epistemology. This paper is a critique of that project.

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Michael Veber
East Carolina University

Citations of this work

Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.
Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-11.

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