Knowledge with and Without Belief

Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132 (2014)
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Abstract

This article argues for the thesis that the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification should be extended to knowledge. A consequence of this thesis is that there is a type of knowledge that requires belief and a type that does not. A familiar example strikingly similar to the sort of example used to introduce the propositional/doxastic justification makes a prima facie case. Additional theoretical advantages are revealed when the distinction is applied within the context of some recent epistemological debates. These include debates over the knowledge account of assertion, testimonial knowledge, self-deception, and the question of whether knowledge can be essentially based on falsehood. It is contended that the sort of distinction offered here provides a way to settle these debates and, at the same time, acknowledge what is correct in the opposing positions

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Michael Veber
East Carolina University

Citations of this work

Knowledge requires belief – and it doesn’t? On belief as such and belief necessary for knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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