Abstract

Can right reason, Properly understood, Provide a justification for our moral duties? modern deontological or kantian type ethical theories generally argue that moral duties are duties to perform certain actions "without" reference to any end to be achieved. But rational action, I.E., Action dictated by practical reason cannot be other than purposive action, I.E., Action directed toward some end to be achieved. As such, Deontology must fail in its attempt to answer the question, Why be moral at all. Turning to teleological theories, The author distinguishes so-Called hedonistic theories, Those in which an end is good merely because it is desired from natural law theories, Those in which the end is desired because it is subjectively good. Because hedonistic teleological theories involve no more than purely prudential considerations of one's own interests, Judgments as to what ought to be done can only be rationally justified in terms of an objective end.