Naïve beliefs shape emotional reactions to evaluative feedback

Cognition and Emotion 35 (2):375-384 (2021)
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Abstract

People are motivated to acquire self-evaluative information that favours themselves or information that confirms their present self-views. We proposed that par...

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Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect.E. Tory Higgins - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (3):319-340.

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