The Content and Meaning of the Transition from the Theory of Relations in Philosophy of Arithmetic to the Mereology of the Third Logical Investigation

Research in Phenomenology 40 (3):408-429 (2010)
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Abstract

In the third Logical Investigation Husserl presents an integrated theory of wholes and parts based on the notions of dependency, foundation ( Fundierung ), and aprioricity. Careful examination of the literature reveals misconceptions regarding the meaning and scope of the central axis of this theory, especially with respect to its proper context within the development of Husserl's thought. The present paper will establish this context and in the process correct a number of these misconceptions. The presentation of mereology in the Logical Investigations will be shown to originate largely from Husserl's implicit self-criticism of his prior views on the unity of a whole presented in his first work, Philosophy of Arithmetic

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