The Freedom to Lie

Philosophy Today 58 (2):141-162 (2014)
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Abstract

This article examines the connection between lying and the concept of freedom, especially in the wake of the social contract tradition. I show that the liar poses a particular threat to the social contract. As a result, lying has been portrayed as a pernicious threat to the political. This culminates in Kant’s outright rejection of lying under any circumstance. From the Kantian perspective, one can be free only if one does not lie. Conversely, Spinoza’s co-implication of virtue and power entails that lying is acceptable under certain circumstances, which enhance one’s freedom. The contrast between Kant’s and Spinoza’s response to lying reveals two fundamentally different ways of conceiving freedom

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Dimitris Vardoulakis
University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury

Citations of this work

Hobbes or Spinoza? Two Epicurean Versions of the Social Contract.Dimitris Vardoulakis - 2020 - InCircolo - Rivista di Filosofia E Culture 9:186-210.

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