Naturalism, Disease, and Levels of Functional Description

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (3):482-493 (2022)
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Abstract

The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory. In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, such parthood choices are based on non-naturalistic considerations. We demonstrate that even when parthood choices are based on the best way to preserve BST, there are counterintuitive results which bring the central tenet of BST into question.

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Author Profiles

Somogy Varga
Aarhus University
David Miguel Gray
University of Memphis

Citations of this work

Persons and their Brains: Life, Death, and Lessened Humanity.Caitlin Maples - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (2):117-127.

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References found in this work

Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.
A rebuttal on health.Christopher Boorse - 1997 - In James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder (eds.), What is Disease? Humana Press. pp. 1--134.

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