Abstract

Those of Collingwood's interpreters who insist that the science of being was abandoned in the later writings, tend to display also a marked dissatisfaction with the logic of question and answer, at least as it is presented in the Essay on Metaphysics. The most influential statement of this interpretation is undoubtedly Rex Martin's. It was initially published as an article in 1989 and was later institutionalized through its incorporation in his 'Editor's Introduction' to the Oxford University Press revised edition of the Essay. I start from the assumption that Collingwood should be read as a hermeneutic philosopher. Having shown elsewhere what this means for Collingwood's conception of being and ontology, I will concentrate here to show that Collingwood's hermeneutics cannot be reconciled with an interpretation that finds no place for question and answer in his philosophy. The logic of question and answer is indispensable to the hermeneutics of Collingwood. I will argue that Martin's expunction of question and answer from Collingwood's philosophy rests on an a sense of meaning that is foreign both to hermeneutics and to Collingwood