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We're Right. They're Wrong
In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2010)
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Citations of this work
Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.
Independence and new ways to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):65-79.
The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.
Religious disagreement: An empirical study among academic philosophers.Helen De Cruz - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1).
A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.
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