Why Husserl should have been a strong revisionist in mathematics

Husserl Studies 18 (1):1-18 (2002)
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Abstract

Husserl repeatedly has claimed that (1) mathematics without a philosophical foundation is not a science but a mere technique; (2) philosophical considerations may lead to the rejection of parts of mathematical practice; but (3) they cannot lead to mathematical innovations. My thesis is that Husserl's third claim is wrong, by his own standards

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Mark van Atten
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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References found in this work

Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics.L. E. J. Brouwer - 1949 - In E. W. Beth, H. J. Pos & H. J. A. Hollak (eds.), Library of the Tenth International Congress in Philosophy, August 1948. North-Holland. pp. 1235--1249.
Consciousness, Philosophy, and Mathematics.L. E. J. Brouwer - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):132-133.

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