Two Problems in Spinoza's Theory of Mind

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 2:337-378 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

My aim in what follows is to expound and (if possible) resolve two problems in Spinoza’s theory of mind. The first problem is how Spinoza can accept a key premise in Descartes’s argument for dualism—that thought and extension are separately conceivable, “one without the help of the other”—without accepting Descartes’s conclusion that no substance is both thinking and extended. Resolving this problem will require us to consider a crucial ambiguity in the notion of conceiving one thing without another, the credentials of Descartes’s principle that each substance has a principal attribute, and the prospect of neutral monism as a theory of the mind. The second problem is how Spinoza can maintain that each mental event is identical with some physical event (and conversely) while denying that there is ever any causal interaction between mental and physical events. If one mental event causes another and the first is identical with some physical event, must that physical event not cause the mental event? Resolving this problem will require looking into the reach of opacity in Spinoza’s philosophy and considering whether there are ever any legitimate exceptions to Leibniz’s Law.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Spinoza on Human Purposiveness and Mental Causation.Justin Steinberg - 2011 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14.
Mind-body causation and explanatory practice.Tyler Burge - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
A note on Descartes and Spinoza.Jonathan Bennett - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (3):379-380.
The Mind-Body Problem.Tim Crane - 1999 - In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Mental Causation.Thomas Kroedel - 2013 - In H. Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications.
Spinoza.Michael Della Rocca - 2008 - New York: Routledge.
The Mind and the Body as 'One and the Same Thing' in Spinoza.Colin R. Marshall - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):897-919.
Spinozas doppelter Dualismus.Han van Ruler - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (3):399-417.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-04-07

Downloads
984 (#12,586)

6 months
480 (#2,807)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

James Van Cleve
University of Southern California

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references