The Kantian Background of Frege’s Notion of Judgement

History and Philosophy of Logic 45 (4):460-475 (2024)
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Abstract

The paper gives, in the first place, a performative reading of Frege's account of non-alethic modalities. Second, it asks the question whether there is an influence of Kant's writings on Frege's notion of assertive force. It is generally acknowledged that the Neo-Kantian tradition has been essential to Frege's development. The paper shows that it can also be fruitful to look at more direct influences of Kant himself, especially on the early Frege. The paper shows that Kant's notion of assertoric modality must have been an inspiration for Frege to make the distinction between judgement, including the assertoric force, and judgeable content. Kant's logical I may also have played a role in Frege's account of judgement in terms of the judging agent, the first person. The conclusion of the paper, though, is that Frege is not a Kantian philosopher, as his idea of logic as providing a positive standard of objectivity is completely new.

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Maria Van Der Schaar
Leiden University

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