Abstract

Through interpretive readings of Plato’s Protagoras and Gorgias I demonstrate how the character ofSocrates manages to reveal a deep concern for virtue in even his most apparently nihilistic interlocutors. Isuggest that these dialogues ask us to consider the possibility of a universal human concern for goodnessthat transcends or collapses the nomos/phusis distinction––one that must be diligently, even courageouslyattended to if our lives are to be effectively applied towards a virtuous ideal of self and society. Toconclude I contrast my readings with those that see Plato as the stern rationalist––the unwaveringproponent of techné––and I open the question of what knowledge of virtue and goodness might entail: Arejustice and goodness knowable to us purely by rational means? Might ethics be subject to some manner ofmeasurement or counting, like the technical arts, in order to ensure its epistemic stability? Is a science ofethics possible? Or do virtue and self-knowledge entail a different kind of understanding in which reasonand technical thinking play limited roles?