Some Remarks on the Modal Ontological Argument

Philo 12 (2):217-227 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper examines the so-called modal ontological argument. It pays special attention to the role that the symmetry and transitivity of the accessibility relation play in the argument, and examines various approaches to a defense of the “possibility premise,” the premise of the argument that states that the existence of a perfect being is metaphysically possible. It contains an analysis of Gödel’s attempt to show that this premise is true, and of a recent formulation by David Johnson of Gödel’s argument.

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Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame

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