Dissertation, University of Zürich (
2020)
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Abstract
Each of us harbor all sorts of irrational beliefs. That is, we maintain and acquire beliefs that violate norms of good reasoning and of virtuous inquiry. Sometimes in spite of our best efforts to be rid of them; sometimes in blissful ignorance of their presence. Other times, we would rather not check if our beliefs conform with the evidence. In some of these instances, it should be possible to be responsible for this type of beliefs, just like we are sometimes responsible for our rational beliefs. A substantial body of literature in philosophy has sought to provide conditions which would be able to account for these cases. Amongst the different of views that are put forward, is a group of views that ground doxastic responsibility in rational abilities. In particular, one of them defends that being responsible for one’s belief requires that this belief arises out of a mechanism which is responsive to epistemic reasons, i.e. to considerations bearing on the truth of their belief. This view is called Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness. I believe that a tension emerges when we try to imagine how this view of doxastic responsibility would apply to the type of beliefs which were introduced above. Indeed, if doxastic responsibility requires being able to form rational beliefs, quid of the beliefs that result precisely from an absence of this ability and yet seem to invite attributions of responsibility?
My goal in this work, is to provide an argument against the Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness view of doxastic responsibility. In particular, I contend that responsiveness to epistemic reasons is not a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility. This goal is part of a more general project which aims at challenging the idea that doxastic responsibility can accounted for in terms of rational abilities.