Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental

Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404 (1980)
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Abstract

Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.

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Robert Van Gulick
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

The Context of Explanation.Martin Bunzl - 1993 - Springer Verlag.

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