Authors
Sander Verhaegh
Tilburg University
Abstract
Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements are symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement.
Keywords Peer disagreement  Conciliationism  Evidential symmetry  Higher-order evidence  Evidentialism
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DOI 10.5117/ANTW2016.1.KOLK
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