Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166 (2010)
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| Abstract |
Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence
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| Keywords | Kant truth definitions |
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| DOI | 10.1515/kant.2010.011 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.
Kant, Truth and Human Nature.Robert Hanna - 2000 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):225 – 250.
View all 8 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Kant’s Ideal of Systematicity in Historical Context.Hein van den Berg - 2021 - Kantian Review 26 (2):261-286.
El papel de la noción de verdad en el planteamiento de la filosofía crítica de Kant.Stéfano Straulino - 2019 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 56:49-74.
Kant’s Conception of Logical Extension and Its Implications.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2012 - Dissertation, University of California, Davis
View all 12 citations / Add more citations
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