Abstract

This project clarifies and strengthens moral deontology and offers a deontological view of rationality. In order to do this, an unquestioned assumption, that the good always provides some reason to wish for or to promote obtaining it, is overturned. This is the pro tanto assumption. It is relied upon explicitly by the moral consequentialist and rational optimizer, and it's relied upon implicitly by the moral deontologist. I argue instead for the non pro tanto thesis, that something's being good may provide no reason to wish for or to promote obtaining it. One may ignore the good: as a reason for action, it may be silent. Two symmetries support the non pro tanto thesis. Under the first symmetry, one may have no reason to promote the personal good, and analogously, one may have no reason to promote the impersonal good. Under the second symmetry, personal good considered on moral grounds may be non pro tanto, and analogously, personal good considered on prudential grounds may be non pro tanto. In conjunction with the first symmetry, I offer support for agent centered restrictions in morality and rationality. Moral restrictions constrain one from promoting the impersonal good and rational restrictions constrain one from promoting the optimal good. It's shown, that under the pro tanto assumption, the good has been hastily thought of as physically classical. Under the non pro tanto thesis's second symmetry, I claim that prudence itself may be deontological and may provide the agent with categorical imperatives. In closing, I suggest how non pro tanto deontology can be integrated with Kant's practical Reason and his teleology.