“I Suppose You Meant to Say...”: Licit and Illicit Manoeuvring in Argumentative Confrontations

Abstract

When interlocutors start to talk at cross purposes it becomes less likely that they will be able to resolve their differences of opinion. Still, a critic, in the confrontation stage of a discussion, should be given some room of manoeuvre for rephrasing and even for revising the arguer’s position. I will distinguish between licit and illicit applications of this form of strategic manoeuvring by stating three soundness conditions.

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Jan Albert Van Laar
University of Groningen

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