How Religion Co-opts Morality in Legal Reasoning

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):241-251 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some recent commentators have acquiesced in the efforts of some religious groups to co-opt concepts of morality, thus leading many—inappropriately, I believe—to think we must keep all morality out of our civic life and especially out of the reasoning in our legal system. I review examples of the confusion in characterizing the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision as a conflict between constitutional rights and religious moral precepts. I argue that this approach capitulates to particular views of morality as religious morality. I consider the appeals to morality in the dissent and the ensuing confusion among commentators about the significance ofthis opinion. I review alternate readings of the Lawrence majority opinion, including proposals that it be considered from the perspectives of the ethicalframeworks of Locke, Mill, or Kant.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
24 (#659,238)

6 months
11 (#241,733)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Julie C Van Camp
California State University, Long Beach

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references