Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

Abstract

We discuss games of both perfect and imperfect information at two levels of structural detail: players’ local actions, and their global powers for determining outcomes of the game. We propose matching logical languages for both. In particular, at the ‘action level’, imperfect information games naturally model a combined ‘dynamic-epistemic language’ – and we find correspondences between special axioms and particular modes of playing games with their information dynamics. At the ‘outcome level’, we present suitable notions of game equivalence, plus some simple representation results.

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2010-12-22

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Johan Van Benthem
University of Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Dynamic logic of preference upgrade.Johan van Benthem & Fenrong Liu - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):157-182.
Merging frameworks for interaction.Johan van Benthem, Jelle Gerbrandy, Tomohiro Hoshi & Eric Pacuit - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):491-526.
Reasoning About Preference Dynamics.Fenrong Liu - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.

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References found in this work

Modal Logic.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2001 - Studia Logica 76 (1):142-148.
Exploring Logical Dynamics.Johan van Benthem - 2001 - Studia Logica 67 (1):111-114.
Logic and game.P. Dekker & M. Pauly - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (3):287-288.

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