Synthese 191 (5):1-33 (2014)
AbstractWe propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a ‘lie that $\varphi $ ’ (where $\varphi $ is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula $\varphi $ . The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents. We distinguish two speaker perspectives: (Obs) an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system, and (Ag) an agent who is lying to another agent, and where both are modelled in the system. We distinguish three addressee perspectives: (Cred) the credulous agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency), (Skep) the skeptical agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs, and (Rev) the belief revising agent who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current, possibly conflicting, beliefs. The logics have complete axiomatizations, which can most elegantly be shown by way of their embedding in what is known as action model logic or in the extension of that logic to belief revision
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Citations of this work
Editors’ Review and Introduction: Lying in Logic, Language, and Cognition.Hans Ditmarsch, Petra Hendriks & Rineke Verbrugge - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (2):466-484.
A Formal Account of Dishonesty.C. Sakama, M. Caminada & A. Herzig - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (2):259-294.
Reverse Public Announcement Operators on Expanded Models.Ryuichi Sebastian Haney - 2018 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 27 (3):205-224.
Levels of Explainable Artificial Intelligence for Human-Aligned Conversational Explanations.Richard Dazeley, Peter Vamplew, Cameron Foale, Charlotte Young, Sunil Aryal & Francisco Cruz - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 299:103525.
Similar books and articles
Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Hans P. Van Ditmarsch - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic.Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):191-209.
My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic.Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
Playing the Lying Game: Detecting and Dealing with Lies and Liars, From Occasional Fibbers to Frequent Fabricators.Gini Graham Scott - 2010 - Praeger.
Moore Problems in Full Dynamic Doxastic Logic.Krister Segerberg - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):95-110.
Term-Modal Logics.Melvin Fitting, Lars Thalmann & Andrei Voronkov - 2001 - Studia Logica 69 (1):133-169.
Just Lies: Finding Augustine's Ethics of Public Lying in His Treatments of Lying and Killing.David Decosimo - 2010 - Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (4):661-697.