Assertion remains strong

Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50 (2023)
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Abstract

Assertion is widely regarded as an act associated with an epistemic position. To assert is to represent oneself as occupying this position and/or to be required to occupy this position. Within this approach, the most common view is that assertion is strong: the associated position is knowledge or certainty. But recent challenges to this common view present new data that are argued to be better explained by assertion being weak. Old data widely taken to support assertion being strong has also been challenged. This paper examines such challenges and finds them wanting. Far from diminishing the case for strong assertion, carefully considering new and old data reveals that assertion is as strong as ever.

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Author Profiles

Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University
Peter van Elswyk
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.
Assertion and certainty.Alexander Dinges - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.

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