Assertion remains strong

Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50 (2023)
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Abstract

Assertion is widely regarded as an act associated with an epistemic position. To assert is to represent oneself as occupying this position and/or to be required to occupy this position. Within this approach, the most common view is that assertion is strong: the associated position is knowledge or certainty. But recent challenges to this common view present new data that are argued to be better explained by assertion being weak. Old data widely taken to support assertion being strong has also been challenged. This paper examines such challenges and finds them wanting. Far from diminishing the case for strong assertion, carefully considering new and old data reveals that assertion is as strong as ever.

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Author Profiles

Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University
Peter van Elswyk
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.
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Judging for ourselves.Justin Khoo - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Asking expresses a desire to know.Peter van Elswyk - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):254-267.
Assertion and Certainty.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):169-186.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.

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