Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

Theory and Decision 74 (1):31-53 (2013)
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Abstract

For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size.

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10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3

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