Abstract

This dissertation relates the philosophy of David Hume to the current debate over the nature and foundations of liberalism. The debate is often described as pitting neo-Kantians such as John Rawls against their contextualist critics, such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Richard Rorty. The thesis of the dissertation is that Hume addresses the issues raised by the debate, and offers resolutions of them more plausible than any of the current alternatives. Four issues are identified and treated in succeeding chapters: the nature of the self, the role of contractarian arguments in justification, the nature of justice, and the place of democracy in liberal theory. Hume begins with certain minimal and plausible universalist assumptions about human nature and the material conditions of human existence. Within these, however, he sees convention and culture as the decisive factors in understanding justice in any particular society. Hume's "thin universalism," I argue, offers a middle way between the universalism of the neo-Kantians and the contextualism of their critics.