Philosophy 55 (October):437-453 (1980)

Abstract
'color is not "in" objects" makes sense only if 'color "is" in objects' does. But it does not, Because we cannot say what it "would be like" if it "were". 'being green' means 'that which looks green' understood "attributively", Not referentially, I.E., 'that which looks green ("whatever that is")', Not 'that which emits certain light-Waves'. "contra" kripke, Heat is 'that which feels hot ("whatever that is")', Though the only thing whose "existence" it requires is molecular motion. If we ask what it would be like to see 'objects themselves', We get incoherence; hence the dichotomy between this and seeing 'ideas' is also meaningless
Keywords Idea  Metaphysics  Object  Perception  Quality  Secondary Quality  Berkeley  Locke
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100049470
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Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.

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