Against maximizing act-consequentialism (june 30, 2008)

In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell. pp. 6--21 (2006)
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Abstract

Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.[i] It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with maximally valuable consequences are not always permissible. The second main objection to maximizing act consequentialism is that it mistakenly holds that morality requires us to maximize value. Morality, I shall argue, only requires that we satisfice (promote sufficiently) value, and thus leaves us a greater range of options than maximizing act consequentialism recognizes.

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Peter Vallentyne
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij Jeff Dunn (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Contractualism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2020 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Shlomi Segall - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):142-155.
How to think about satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.

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