Abstract
According to modal realism formulated by David Lewis, there exist
concrete possible worlds. As he argues the hypothesis is serviceable and
that is a sufficient reason to think it is true. On the other side, Lewis
does not consider the pragmatic reasons to be conclusive. He admits
that the theoretical benefits of modal realism can be illusory or that the
acceptance of controversial ontology for the sake of theoretical benefits
might be misguided in the first place. In the first part of the paper, I
consider the worry and conclude that although the worry is justified,
there can be an epistemological justification for his theory. Next, I
outline the so-called indispensability argument for the legitimacy of
mathematical Platonism. Finally, I argue that the argument, if accepted,
can be applied to metaphysics in general, to the arguing for the
existence of concrete (im)possibilia in particular.