Abstract

Theories of possible worlds abound. Since the introduction of modal logic, the term of a possible world, and the very nature of an entity denoted by the term, have stood on the top of metaphysical inquiries. A possible world, roughly speaking, is a complete way things could have been. On the face of it, whatever is possible takes place in some possible world, and whatever is not possible, does not. The aim of the present book is to argue that even impossible things happen. By taking David Lewis’s Modal Realism (henceforth as “MR”) seriously, I claim that besides infinitely many concrete ways things could have been, there exist ways things could not have been. I call them concrete impossible worlds. In Chapter I, I outline Lewis’s well-defined conception of philosophical analysis. I present its structure, aims, methodology and criteria for success. Besides the virtues of the Lewisian conception, I point out several limitations the theory has and offer very simple solution: the admission of concrete impossible worlds. In Chapter II, I present a version of an epistemological objection against MR and a positive account in favour of Modal Fictionalism (henceforth as “MF”). I then present the puzzle in this matter and attempt to generalise my point. 9 Introduction Chapter III demonstrates how flexible Lewis’s theory is. I consider a putative impossibility of there being island universes – spatiotemporally disjoint spacetimes – and show what a proponent of modal realism can do in order to account for it. I present three possible moves: a revision of our pre-theoretical opinions, a modification of our definitions and, finally, an ex- tension of our metaphysical commitments. I consider two ersatz theories of impossible worlds in Chapter IV. In particular, I scrutinize Franz Berto’s and Edwin Mares’s (hybrid) theories of MR. Although I admit that the theories radically extend the scope of applications of MR without extending its metaphysical commitments, the approaches do have some limits. Finally, in Chapter V, I present Extended Modal Realism (henceforth EMR), a theory according to which the best way to go in order to account for impossible phenomena is to ex- tend our metaphysical base by genuine impossibilia. I try to (at least) weaken, if not meet, the crucial objections to the proposal. Namely, I challenge the proclaimed universality of classical logic and, subsequently, motivate certain kind of paraconsistent approach to modal reality. Although the consequences are very hard to swallow, I argue that it is because of the fact that we are unsure of our pre-theoretical opinions concerning the impossible.