Paradoxical Aspects of the Russellian Conception of Existence

Foundations of Science 28 (3):911-925 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper, the authors try to clarify the relations between Meinong’s and Russell's thoughts on the ontological ideas of existence. The Meinongian theory on non-existent objects does not in itself violate the principle of non-contradiction, since the problem that this hypothesis offers to the theory of definite descriptions is not so much a logical problem as an ontological problem. To demonstrate this we will establish what we believe are the two main theses basic to the theory of descriptions: the epistemological thesis and logical thesis.

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References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 89:465-466.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):640-642.
Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1949 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 54 (2):198-199.

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