American Journal of Bioethics 15 (2):25-27 (2015)

Tomasz Żuradzki
Jagiellonian University
Jeremy R. Garrett claims that the nature and scope of our rescue duties cannot be properly understood and addressed without reference to social context or institutional background conditions. In my comment I focus not on social or institutional but on psychological background conditions that are also necessary for the conceptualization of rescue cases. These additional conditions are of crucial importance since an entire paradigm of “rescue medicine” is founded, as Garret notices, on the powerful and immediate “impulse to rescue” (Garrett 2015). I understand this “impulse” as the preference toward identified victims, and I argue that it may sometimes distort genuine moral judgments in rescue cases.
Keywords research ethics  moral theory  genetic research  statistical victims  identified victims  rescue medicine
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/15265161.2014.990168
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Obligations to Merely Statistical People.Caspar Hare - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (5-6):378-390.
Collectivizing Rescue Obligations in Bioethics.Jeremy R. Garrett - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics 15 (2):3-11.
The Duty to Rescue in Genomic Research.Michael Ulrich - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (2):50-51.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Normative Significance of Identifiability.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - Ethics and Information Technology 21 (4):295-305.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
97 ( #119,176 of 2,499,424 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #62,916 of 2,499,424 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes