Diametros 51:113-136 (2017)

Tomasz Żuradzki
Jagiellonian University
The results of empirical research show that people prefer to help identified individuals rather than unidentified ones. This preference has an important influence on many private and public decisions, for example concerning vaccination or the distribution of healthcare resources. The aim of this article is to define the terms: “identified”, “unidentified”, “statistical”, and then to analyze three philosophical arguments concerning the normative implications of this preference: 1) contractualism ex ante ; 2) fair distribution of chances and risks; 3) principles regarding the concentration of good effects and the distribution of bad effects. I will demonstrate that these arguments, which are related to interesting philosophical problems, such as counterfactuals, are not convincing.
Keywords Caspar Hare  statistical people  uncertainty  niepewność  healthcare  ryzyko  osoby zidentyfikowane  opieka zdrowotna  identified people  osoby statystyczne  risk
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DOI 10.13153/diam.51.2017.1034
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The Normative Significance of Identifiability.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - Ethics and Information Technology 21 (4):295-305.

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