Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):610-615 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Buchanan (2014) argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet (2016) develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan’s own proposal. I argue that both theorists fail to notice a significant distinction between the kinds of cases at issue. Those appearing to count against direct reference theory must be described such that speakers have false beliefs about the identity of the object to which they intend to refer, beliefs that appear relevant to the determination of what constitutes communicative success. This suggests, further, that cases of this sort do not provide a basis for robust generalizations about singular reference.

Similar books and articles

Referential Intentions and Communicative Luck.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):379-384.
The edenic theory of reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.
Reference, Understanding, and Communication.Ray Buchanan - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):55-70.
Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227.
Extending Direct Reference.Robert Hanna - 1997 - ProtoSociology 10:134-154.
Direct reference and implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):61-90.
Complex demonstratives and their singular contents.David Braun - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (1):57-99.
Reference and propositional attitudes.Brian Loar - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62.
The nameability of possible objects.Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - From a Logical Point of View 3:14-33.
Communication and indexical reference.Jonas Åkerman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):355 - 366.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-07

Downloads
615 (#25,598)

6 months
86 (#43,404)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elmar Unnsteinsson
University College Dublin

References found in this work

The semantics of singular terms.Brian Loar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.
A Gricean Theory of Malaprops.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (4):446-462.
The edenic theory of reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.

View all 10 references / Add more references