Abstract

In the final chapter attempts by Kant to show how man can be noumenally free and phenomenally determined are presented first. Second, it is argued that Kant's solution has nothing to do with the dilemma unless one is actually equipped with intellectual intuition, by means of which Zen masters claim to have solved such a perennial problem as freedom and determinism. Finally, Zen Buddhism, a form of mysticism, is introduced and examined to see its philosophical relevance by an analysis of the key notion of "seeing into, or pointing to, thy self-nature." ;In the second chapter, in dealing with the metaphysical problem of freedom and determinism, the incompatibilitists' positions are closely examined in the light of both Campbell's notion of contra-causal freedom which is conceived only by introspection and the determinists' objection to such an approach to the problem. Because the controversy cannot be settled unless we are free from viewing one position from another position's point of view, it is pointed out that an analysis of their conception of the self must be required in order to provide an adequate solution of the dilemma. ;In the third chapter, the Cartesian substance theory of the self and the Human bundle theory of the self are examined. First, it is argued that neither is adequate as a theory of the self to solve the dilemma of freedom and determinism. Second, the Kantian notion of a noumenal self is introduced as an alternative in connection with Ryle's notion of the elusive self and Wittgenstein's idea of the self as an extensionless point, which eventually lead us to the mystical realm of noumena. ;In the first of four chapters, Schlick's soft-determinism is examined. His discussion of freedom as an opposite of compulsion gives rise to his view that the dilemma is a pseudo-problem based on linguistic confusions. This view is evaluated in terms of Campbell's libertarianism and Edwards' hard-determinism, and credited as a solution of a considerable part of the dilemma, especially in connection with moral responsibility. ;The dilemma of freedom and determinism concerns the meaning and interrelations of three basic ideas: freedom, causation, and moral responsibility. Traditionally, it has been said that there may be three possible positions that can be taken in this problem. First, the belief that determinism is false and we are free. Second, the belief that determinism is true and we are free. Third, the belief that determinism is true and we are not free. The first position is called libertarianism, whereas the second is known as compatibilism and the third as hard-determinism. In this dissertation, an attempt is made to show that the genuine solution of the dilemma must be preceded by an analysis of the concept of both freedom and determinism. Since both the libertarian's and the determinist's notions of the self are not adequate to solve the problem, I introduce the mystic notion of the self and mysticism, the fourth position, according to which the dilemma is illusory