Fatalism as a Metaphysical Thesis

Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 39 (4) (2016)
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Abstract

Even though fatalism has been an intermittent topic of philosophy since Greek antiquity, this paper argues that fate ought to be of little concern to metaphysicians. Fatalism is neither an interesting metaphysical thesis in its own right, nor can it be identified with theses that are, such as realism about the future or determinism.

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Ulrich Meyer
Colgate University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Future contingents and relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.

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