The non-trivial concept of truth in Richard Kirkham’s Theories of truth: a critical introduction

South African Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):116-118 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kirkham’s book is not a plain attempt of asking the questions like ‘What is truth?’ since it would, according to him, be one more mistake followed by confusion. The components of this four-dimensional confusion (vagueness, ambiguity, several ways of describing the same project, and one answer for two distinctly different questions about truth) find its original explanation in Kirkham’s book. Having stated that all of the previous theories of truth were just irrelevant to the question of “What is truth” because when asking different questions about truth, he draws his non-trivial approach of assigning each theorist to the particular question (or ‘project’) he or she was trying to answer with his or her theory of truth. So, the main merit of Kirkham’s work is the clarification of this most urgent philosophical problem of truth on the way of metaphysics.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,874

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Does the Lie Contradict the Truth?Wybranie-Skardowska Urszula & Wybraniec-Skardowska Urszula - 2010 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 20 (33):127-153.
The fixed point non-classical theory of truth value gaps by S. Kripke.Artyom Ukhov - 2017 - Vestnik SPbSU. Philosophy and Conflict Studies 33 (2):224-233.
What is Quine's view of truth?Donald Davidson - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):437 – 440.
The Conflict and Reconciliation of Two Conceptions of Truth.Bo Mou - 1996 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
Truth as a relational property.Douglas Edwards - 2016 - Synthese 198 (2):735-757.
Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 217–232..
Truth as One and Many.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-08

Downloads
28 (#781,264)

6 months
6 (#812,813)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Artyom Ukhov
Ivanovo State University (Alumnus)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.

Add more references