Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:19-40 (1993)
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Abstract

One standard objection to the view that phenomenal experience is functionally determined is based upon what has come to be called ‘The Absent Qualia Hypothesis’, the idea that there could be a person or a machine that was functionally exactly like us but that felt or consciously experienced nothing at all. Advocates of this hypothesis typically maintain that we can easily imagine possible systems that meet the appropriate functional specifications but that intuitively lack any phenomenal consciousness. Ned Block, for example, asks us to suppose that a billion Chinese people are each given a two-way radio with which to communicate with one another and with an artificial body. The movements of the body are controlled by the radio signals, and the signals themselves are made in accordance with instructions the Chinese people receive from a vast display in the sky which is visible to all of them. The instructions are such that the participating Chinese people together realize whatever programs the functionalist supposes underlie human phenomenal experience.

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Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
How many concepts of consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
The path not taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
Fallacies or analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.

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References found in this work

Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.

View all 24 references / Add more references