A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character

Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39 (1995)
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10.2307/2214219

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Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization.Matthias Michel - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2411-2428.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.

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