Abstract
At the end of Book 1, Part 1, Section IV of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume informs us that the topics in Book 1, Part 1 “may be consider’d as the elements of this philosophy”. Among the topics discussed in Part 1 of this Book is distinctions of reason, which he covers briefly toward the end of his treatment of abstract ideas. While other topics treated in this Part of Book 1 are clearly utilized in subsequent Sections, Parts, and Books of the Treatise, distinctions of reason are rarely mentioned beyond his discussion of this topic toward the end of Section V11 of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise. My paper has several aims: First, I will attempt to show the role that distinctions of reason play in providing our awareness of space; second, I will show how Hume’s empiricist account of Geometry in the Treatise is developed through his account of our awareness space; and third, I will briefly address the altered account of Geometry in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.