Authors
Mark Alfano
Macquarie University
John Greco
Georgetown University
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and which methods to use. It will be helpful to note some terminology before proceeding. First, we use ‘cognitive’, ‘epistemic’ and ‘intellectual’ synonymously. Second, we often use ‘normative’ broadly to include not only norms and rules, but also duties and values. Finally, ‘practitioners’ names contemporary virtue epistemologists.
Keywords virtue epistemology  intellectual virtue  virtue  epistemology  knowledge
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
Virtue Epistemology.Heather Battaly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.

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