Belief Reports: Defaults, Intentions and Scorekeeping

In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag. pp. 363 (2010)
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Abstract

Dynamic approaches to semantics like Discourse Representation Theory or Jaszczolt's Default Semantics provide more and more effective tools to represent how speakers handle meanings in linguistic practices. These deeper perspectives may give us a lever to lift some of the philosophical perplexities crowding semantics and to catch a glimpse of what hides beneath them. In this paper, I exploit these approaches with relation to the analysis of belief reports. However, it will emerge that, despite their benefits, the theories that support these representational advances may be themselves question begging from a philosophical point of view. Brandom's remarks about normative character of intentional content offer an important contribution to bring into focus the right path to drive these representational improvements towards really acceptable answers to philosophical questions about semantics.

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Giacomo Turbanti
University of Pisa

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