AL-Mukhatabat 16:163-195 (2015)

Giacomo Turbanti
University of Pisa
John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell argues that there is no role for inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying the content of an observational judgment in terms of itself. This paper examines the semantical consequences of the analysis of the content of empirical judgments in terms of their inferential role. These, it is suggested, are distinct from the epistemological paradoxes that McDowell charges the inferentialist approach with.
Keywords Inferentialism  Experience  Disjunctivism  Defeasible reasoning  Default entitlement  Inferential perspectives
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):389-394.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Inferentialism, compositionality and the thickness of meaning.Dongho Choi - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:335-344.
Inferentialism and Singular Reference.Mark Mccullagh - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220.
Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.
Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on M Aking It Explicit.John McDowell - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):121-140.
Motivating Inferentialism.Mark Mcculiagh - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):77-84.
Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):141-60.
Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
Meaning and Inference.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2003 - In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia.


Added to PP index

Total views
107 ( #109,384 of 2,506,173 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #63,650 of 2,506,173 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes