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We will do it: An analysis of group-intentions
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):249-277 (1991)
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Citations of this work
Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization.John R. Searle (ed.) - 2009 - , US: Oxford University Press.
The Feasibility of Collectives' Actions.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):453-467.
Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
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