Topoi 39 (2):317-327 (2020)
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Abstract |
When acting in social contexts, we are often able to voluntarily coordinate our choices with one another. It has been suggested that this ability relies on the adoption of preferences that transcend those of the individuals involved in the social interaction. Conditional game theory provides a formal framework that facilitates the study of coordinated rational choice in a way that disentangles the concepts of individual preference and group agency. We argue that these concepts are complementary: individual preferences are formed in a social context and groups coordinate as socially influenced preferences interact. In particular, we show that if agents can engage in conditional reasoning and can define their preferences in the form of hypothetical propositions, group-level coordination can be grounded only on the preference of individuals.
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DOI | 10.1007/s11245-018-9589-6 |
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References found in this work BETA
Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference.Judea Pearl - 1988 - Morgan Kaufmann.
Truth and Probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
The Construction of Social Reality. Anthony Freeman in Conversation with John Searle.J. Searle & A. Freeman - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):180-189.
Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.Amartya Sen - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):317-344.
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