Plato's "Euthyphro"

Dissertation, Columbia University (1990)
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Abstract

Despite earlier interest in the dialogue, Plato's Euthyphro has received little attention over the past fifty years. The few works on the dialogue which have appeared during this time have either concerned themselves primarily with the broadest issues, or else have focused upon special problems of interpretation. The present work, on the other hand, attempts a full and detailed analysis of all of the most important aspects of the dialogue, paying close attention to the language of the text, as well as to the structure of the arguments which thus emerge. ;The thesis of the dissertation is that the Euthyphro presents an indirect argument in favor of the assumption of absolute moral standards. The dialogue describes a meeting between Socrates and Euthyphro. Euthyphro is prosecuting his father on a charge of murder. His family thinks that this action is impious; but Euthyphro justifies his proceeding with the claim that one must act in accordance with the law of the gods; and that, while the family does not know how the gods feel about the pious and the impious, Euthyphro does possess this special knowledge. Euthyphro and his family are thus seen to have offered competing claims as to what, in the given circumstance, is pious or impious. This calls forth the Socratic search for the eidos or idea , which shall serve as the standard or paradigm by which the particular actions can be judged. This standard is assumed to be universal, self-identical, and logically distinct from its particulars, an assumption that is implicitly justified throughout the course of the dialogue. In answer to Socrates' request to state the universal, Euthyphro offers four successive definitions. But in each case Socrates shows that Euthyphro has failed to grasp the universal, and has only proffered statements about particular pious things. What Socrates wants, however, is neither an example, nor simply some characteristic mark that all holy things might happen to possess, but rather that very essence by virtue of which all pious things are pious. For only this essence will provide the standard that is required. Euthyphro, however, fails to understand Socrates' request, and this failure is shown to arise from Euthyphro's conceit of wisdom. This, in turn, justifies the function of Socrates' negative elenchus, as well as the aporia with which the dialogue concludes

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