Simultaneity in dispositional interaction?

Ratio 23 (3):322-338 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


My aim is to question an assumption that is often made in the philosophical literature on dispositions. This is the assumption that, generally, the stimulation (or ‘triggering’) of a disposition temporally precedes the manifesting of that disposition. I will begin by examining precisely what the trigging of a disposition may be thought to consist in, and will identify two plausible views. I will then argue that on either of these views about triggering, a case can be made against the view that the triggering of a disposition always occurs before the manifesting of that disposition. More precisely, if the first view about triggering is accepted, and certain plausible assumptions about dispositions are put into place, a metaphysical argument can be formulated for the claim that the stimulation of a disposition never occurs before that disposition manifests. If the second view about triggering is accepted, the question concerning simultaneity becomes an empirical one. There are, however, examples of dispositional interaction which, on the second view about triggering, clearly seem to involve simultaneity.1

Similar books and articles

Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.Rob Vanderbeeken & Erik Weber - 2002 - Behavior and Philosophy 30:43 - 59.
Superficial Dispositionalism.Lauren Ashwell - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):635-653.
The Ontology of Pure Dispositions.William A. Bauer - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):35-72.
The Explanatory Import of Dispositions: A Defense of Scientific Realism.Jon D. Ringen - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:122 - 133.
Dispositions, rules, and finks.Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
Opposing powers.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.


Added to PP

95 (#148,126)

6 months
2 (#332,731)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen Mumford.
Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Dispositions and conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.

View all 8 references / Add more references